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In this paper, we examine the nature of the shocks that hit the small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Japan during the global financial crisis that occurred in the wake 
of the massive number of non-performing subprime loans in the U.S. We examine how 
the SMEs responded to the shocks, using the unique surveys that were conducted by the 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in 2008 and 2009. The 
shocks were identified as demand, supply and financial shocks. The demand shock was 
the most prevalent, while the financial shock was the least frequent. The SMEs took a 
spectrum of measures against the demand shock by seeking help from suppliers and 
financial institutions. We find that the measures taken by the SMEs crucially depended 
on the bank-firm relationship, but not on the customer-supplier relationship. The 
bank-dependent SMEs asked their closely-affiliated financial institutions for help, while 
the SMEs that were less dependent on financial institutions sought help primarily from 
their suppliers. 
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1. Introduction   
    The global financial crisis, triggered by the massive number of non-performing subprime 
loans owned by financial institutions in the United States, plunged the export-led Japanese 
economy into a severe recession. Figure 1 shows the real GDP growth rate, or the rate of change 
relative to the same quarter of the previous year, in Japan from 2006 to 2010. The GDP growth rate 
recorded negative values for seven consecutive quarters, from the second quarter of 2008 to the 
fourth quarter of 2009. Figure 2 shows the real net exports in Japan from 2005 to 2010. Net exports 
decreased drastically in the fall of 2008, and net exports in the first quarter of 2009 fell down to 
one-fifth of the level they had been at on the eve of the sudden drop. Figure 1 and 2, taken together, 
indicate that the Japanese economy depends heavily upon foreign demand for Japanese goods.   
    Figure 3 shows the sales growth rate, relative to the same quarter the previous year, of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors by firm size. The large firms are defined as those 
whose equity capital is above 1 billion yen. The medium-sized firms are those whose equity capital 
is between 100 million yen and 1 billion yen. The small firms are those whose equity capital is 
below 100 million yen. The growth rate remained negative for most of the periods during 2008 and 
2009, irrespective of sector or firm size. We can see that the sales of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are more volatile than those of large enterprises. This volatility implies that the 
SMEs are more vulnerable to shocks. Indeed, the credit crunch from the late 1990s to the early 
2000s in Japan substantially affected the SMEs that required bank loans to support their daily 
activities.   
        Thus, it is important to investigate how severely the SMEs were affected by the shocks during 
the recent global financial crisis and how the SMEs responded to these shocks. In particular, 
understanding the mechanism through which the shocks were transmitted across the SMEs would 
be indispensable for policy makers who need to develop effective measures to rescue SMEs during 
recessions. The purpose of this study is to quantitatively examine how the SMEs were affected by 
the shocks during the global financial crisis and how the SMEs took action against the shocks. In 
this study, we identify the shocks that hit the SMEs during the global financial crisis and then 
estimate how the SMEs responded to those shocks. In particular, we examine whether the 
relationships between the firms and their financial institutions and those between the firm and their 3 
 
customers and their suppliers helped to mitigate the shocks that hit the SMEs.   
Our study is unique because we identify the types of shocks that hit the SMEs and the 
responses by the SMEs to these shocks directly from the unique surveys of the SMEs conducted by 
the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). The RIETI conducted two surveys 
in the midst of the global financial crisis to investigate the current status of financing for SMEs. We 
use the questionnaires of these surveys to identify three types of shocks from the surveys—demand, 
supply and financial shocks—and to identify the measures taken by the SMEs against these shocks.   
The conventional approach to identifying the sources of shocks in a time series analysis is to 
extract purely exogenous shocks by imposing some identifying assumptions, such as Choleski 
decomposition, on the structure of the econometric models.
2 The shocks thus obtained are 
conditional upon the assumptions imposed on the model. Our direct approach to identify the shocks 
from the survey data is free from these kind of arbitrary assumptions.   
Let us preview our main findings. Demand shock was the most prevalent shock that hit the 
SMEs during the global financial crisis, followed by supply shock. The financial shocks were 
relatively less frequent. The SMEs responded to the demand shock in a variety of ways, from 
passing the shocks along to their suppliers to seeking help from both private and public financial 
institutions. The manner in which the SMEs responded to the demand shock crucially hinged upon 
the bank-firm relationship. The SMEs with longer-term bank-firm relationships turned to the banks 
with the closest or second-closest relationship for help to cushion the shocks; the SMEs with 
shorter-term bank-firm relationships primarily passed the shocks along to their suppliers. Unlike the 
bank-firm relationship, the customer-supplier relationship had little effect on the manner in which 
the SMEs responded to the shocks. The importance of the bank-firm relationship for the SMEs as a 
buffer against negative shocks is consistent with the role of the main banks in Japan. The main 
banks have played the role of delegated monitor and have supplied loans to their affiliated firms. 
The information of affiliated firms is accumulated in the main banks through multiple long-term 
transactions, which enables the main banks to bail out financially troubled client firms. 
3 
Our findings deepen our understanding of the propagation mechanism for shocks across firms. 
When the bank-firm relationship is prevalent and the financial sector is healthy, the shocks 
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3  See Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) for a comprehensive overview of 
main bank system in Japan.   4 
 
originating on the demand side can be cushioned by financial institutions that lend helping hands to 
the SMEs. On the other hand, when the bank-firm relationship is weak, the shocks are propagated 
widely across firms through customer-supplier chains. This pattern of shock propagations indicates 
that soundness of the financial sector is very important in mitigating adverse shocks.         
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain how to identify the shocks that hit 
the SMEs and extract the responses to the shocks from the SMEs through the survey questionnaires. 
In Section 3, we estimate a probit model of the response function of the SMEs to the shocks. In 
Section 4, we re-estimate the model developed in Section 3 by classifying the SMEs by the 
bank-firm relationship and the customer-supplier relationship. Based on the estimation results, we 
uncover the propagation mechanism of the shocks that hit the SMEs during the global financial 
crisis and the measures taken by the SMEs in response to the shocks. Section 5 concludes this 
study.  
 
2. Identification of the Shocks and Responses to the Shocks: Evidence from the Survey Data 
The RIETI conducted two surveys, primarily targeted for the SMEs: The Survey on the Status 
of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions, in February 2008 and The Survey on 
the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions following the Financial 
Crisis, in February 2009.
4    The former survey was sent to 17,018 companies nationwide and 6,124 
companies, or 36.0%, responded. This survey was designed to examine the characteristics of SME 
financing. We mainly rely on the latter survey to identify the shocks that hit the SMEs during the 
global financial crisis. In this survey, the RIETI targeted 5,979 of the firms that responded to the 
2008 survey and 4,103, or 68.6%, responded. The goal of the survey was to see how the bank-firm 
relationship and the customer-supplier relationship had changed in the midst of the global financial 
crisis and what kind of measures the SMEs took in response to these changes.   
 
Identification of the shocks 
We can identify the sources of the shocks from question 4 through 6 in the 2009 survey. 
Question 4 asks for the details of any changes the respondent firm experienced in relation to its 
customers after September 2008. There are eight choices in all:   
                                                        
4  See Uesugi et al.(2009) for a comprehensive summary of the survey results.   5 
 
1. Financial distress or bankruptcy of customers     
2. Increase in irrecoverable loans     
3.  Decrease  in  sales  and  orders  received            
4. Cut in sales price   
5. Lengthening of accounts receivable terms   
6.  Lengthening  of  bills  receivable  terms            
7.  Fall  of  the  cash  payment  ratio             
8. Nothing   
If the respondent chooses at least one item from 1 through 7, then we can say that the respondent 
was hit by demand shock.     
  Question 5 asks for the details of any changes the respondent firm experienced in relation to 
its main supplier, as well as other suppliers, after September 2008. There are six choices in all:   
1. Financial distress or bankruptcy of suppliers     
2. Increase in purchase costs   
3.  Shortening  of  accounts  payable  terms       
4. Shortening of bills payable terms   
5.  Rise  of  the  cash  payment  ratio             
6. Nothing     
If the respondent chooses at least one item from 1 through 5, then we can say that the respondent 
was hit by supply shock from its main supplier and/or other suppliers.         
Question 6 asks for the details of any changes the respondent firm experienced in relation to 
its financial institutions after September in 2008. Each question is asked for three types of financial 
institutions: the financial institution with the largest loan outstanding (main bank), the financial 
institution with the second-largest loan outstanding (second bank) and any other financial 
institutions (other banks). There are nine choices in all:   
1. Rejection of new loan application               
2. Withdrawal of loans before maturity 
3. Less frequent visits from financial institutions   
4.  Decrease  in  loans  outstanding         
5. Increase in borrowing rate 6 
 
6.  Shortening  of  borrowing  period      
7. Provision of additional collateral 
8.  Provision  of  additional  guarantee     
9. Nothing 
If the respondent chooses at least one item from 1 through 8, except for 3, then we can say that the 
respondent was hit by financial shock from its main, second and/or other banks. 
      The first column of Table 1 shows the proportion of respondent firms that were hit by each type 
of shock. Demand shock is predominant, and more than 80% of the firms were hit by demand 
shock. Supply shock follows demand shock, and about one-third of the firms were hit by supply 
shock. Financial shock was less important than demand or supply shocks for the SMEs in Japan 
during the global financial crisis. Less than 20 % of the firms were hit by financial shocks from any 
type of bank. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show the proportion of firms hit by each type 
of shock by firm size. Large (small) firms are defined as those whose total assets are above (below) 
the sample median. More small firms were hit by supply shocks, but more large firms were hit by 
financial shock from other banks.   
   Next, we will examine whether the bank-firm or customer-supplier relationship affects the 
probability that a firm is hit by each type of shock. The first and second columns of Table 2 
compare the proportion of firms hit by each type of shock, examining the firms with a short 
bank-firm relationship and those with long bank-firm relationship. The bank-firm relationship is 
defined as short (long) when a firm has a business relationship with the financial institution for less 
(more) than the median number of years, which is 30 years. 
5  It is more likely that the firms with a 
shorter bank-firm relationship are hit by financial shocks. As is expected, the difference in the 
proportion of short bank relationship firms to long bank relationship firms hit by the financial 
shocks is statistically significant. In particular, the firms with longer bank-firm relationships are far 
less likely to suffer from financial shocks because of assistance from their main and second banks, 
probably reflecting the provision of financial services from those banks, including favorable loan 
t e r m s   a n d   a d d i t i o n a l   l o a n s   i n   c a s e   o f   e m e r g e n c y .                        
      In contrast, the length of the customer-supplier relationship has little effect on the proportion of 
                                                        
5  Question 28 in the 2008 survey asks for the respondent firm name of the firm’s main and second 
banks as well as for the length of the business relationship with those banks.     7 
 
firms hit by the shocks. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 compare the proportion of firms hit 
by each type of shock between the firms with a short customer-supplier relationship and those with 
a long customer-supplier relationship. The customer-supplier relationship is defined as short (long) 
when a firm has business relationship with its main supplier for less (more) than the median 
number of years, which is 26 years. The firms with the shorter customer-supplier relationships are 
more likely to be hit by the financial shocks through their main and second banks. However, the 
difference is barely significant at the 10 % level.         
   Last, we examine whether the shocks the firms experience are correlated. Table 3 shows the 
correlation coefficient between the six types of shocks. Two types of supply shock are highly 
correlated. The financial shocks also exhibit higher correlations. In particular, the correlation 
coefficient between the shocks from the main and other suppliers is 0.725. The correlation 
coefficients between financial shocks all exceed 0.5, indicating that a firm hit by one type of 
financial shock is more likely to be hit by the other types of financial shock.             
 
Response to shocks 
      Next, we identify the measures taken by the SMEs in response to these shocks. Question 8 asks 
about the measures taken by the respondent firms during the recession triggered by the global 
financial crisis. The measures are broadly divided into three categories: measures taken in relation 
to customers, those taken in relation to suppliers and those taken in relation to financial institutions. 
The possible measures taken in relation to the firm’s customers have eight choices in all: 
1 .   I n c r e a s i n g   s a l e s   v o l u m e                    
2. Raising sales price 
3. Shortening of accounts receivable terms         
4. Shortening of bills receivable terms   
5.  Switch  to  payment  by  cash                 
6. Use of trade credit insurance 
    7.  Intensifying  explanations  to  customers      
8. Nothing   
If the respondent chooses at least one item from 1 through 6, then we can say that the respondent 
firm took measures vis-à-vis its customers.   8 
 
The possible measures taken in relation to the respondent’s main supplier, as well as other 
suppliers, have seven choices in all: 
1.  Decreasing  purchase  volume              
2. Cutting purchase cost   
3. Lengthening of accounts payable terms         
4. Lengthening of bills payable terms   
5. Raising the payment ratio on trust or bills     
6. Intensifying explanations to suppliers     
7. Nothing 
If the respondent chooses at least one item from 1 through 5, then we can say that the respondent 
firm took measures vis-à-vis its suppliers.   
The measures taken in relation to the financial institutions that have business transactions with 
the respondent firm have thirteen choices in all: 
        1. Borrowing from the main bank     
        2. Lengthening of the borrowing period from the main bank   
3. Borrowing from the second bank 
4. Lengthening of the borrowing period from the second bank 
5. Borrowing from other banks 
        6. Lengthening of borrowing period from other banks   
    7. Borrowing with a credit guarantee         
8. Borrowing from public financial institutions   
    9.  Borrowing  from  non-banks   
10. Extending overdraft 
11. Extending commitment line   
12. Intensifying explanations to financial institutions 
13. Nothing 
If the respondent firm chooses 1 or 2, then we can say that the respondent took measures vis-à-vis 
its main bank. If the respondent firm chooses 3 or 4, then we can say that the respondent took 
measures vis-à-vis its second bank. If the respondent firm chooses 5 or 6, then we can say that the 
respondent took measures vis-à-vis other banks. If the respondent firm chooses item 8, then we can 9 
 
say that the respondent took measures vis-à-vis public financial institutions. If the respondent firm 
chooses item 7, then we can say that the respondent took measures to request guaranteed loans.   
The first column of Table 4 shows the proportion of the respondent firms that took each type 
of the measures explained above. The largest proportion of the firms (42.8%) took measures 
vis-à-vis their customers. Although this proportion is the largest, it is much smaller than the 
proportion of firms that were hit by demand shock. The proportion of the firms that took measures 
vis-à-vis their suppliers hovers around 30%. It is quite reasonable that the proportion of firms that 
took measures vis-à-vis their main banks (32.2%) is the largest among the measures taken vis-à-vis 
the financial institutions, followed by that of the firms that took measures vis-à-vis their second 
banks (17.9%).   
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 compare the proportion of firms that took each type of 
measure by firm size, as measured by total assets. The proportion of firms that took measures 
vis-à-vis their main banks, second banks and other banks is higher for large firms, which might 
reflect the relatively strong bargaining power of a large firm vis-à-vis its financial institutions. The 
proportion of firms that requested guaranteed loans is higher for small firms. The first and second 
columns of Table 5 compare the proportion of firms that took each type of measure between the 
firms with short bank-firm relationships and those with long bank-firm relationships. The 
proportion of firms that took measures vis-à-vis their financial institution is higher for the firms 
with a short bank-firm relationship. This result might simply reflect the fact that the firms with 
short bank-firm relationships were vulnerable to financial shocks.   
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 compare the proportion of firms that took each type of 
measure between the firms with a short customer-supplier relationship and those with a long 
customer-supplier relationship. It is interesting to note that the proportion of firms that took 
measures vis-à-vis their main and other suppliers is higher for the firms with a short 
customer-supplier relationship, even though there is no difference between short or long 
customer-supplier relationship firms when looking at the proportion of firms hit by supply shocks.               
    The correlation coefficients between the seven types of measure taken are shown in Table 6. 
We can see that the correlation coefficients between the measures taken vis-à-vis customers and 
suppliers are high. The correlation coefficients between the measures taken vis-à-vis main and other 
suppliers are notably high (0.859). We also observe that the correlation coefficients between the 10 
 
measures taken vis-à-vis financial institutions are high, from 0.272 (that between the measures 
taken vis-à-vis the main bank and other banks) to 0.443 (that between the measures taken vis-à-vis 
the main bank and the second bank).   
 
3. An Estimation of the SMEs’ Response Function to the Shocks 
    In the previous section, we used the questions from the survey to identify the sources of the 
shocks that hit the SMEs during the global financial crisis and the measures taken by the SMEs. In 
this section, we estimate the response pattern of the SMEs to the shocks by combining the survey 
responses and our identification of the type of shocks.   
   The idea behind a response function model is simple. We model the response pattern of the 
SMEs by relating the measures taken by the SMEs to the shocks that hit the SMEs. We estimate 
this model using the probit with the attributes of the SMEs as additional control variables. 
Specifically our response function is written as follows: 


























     ( 1 )  
            w h e r e   DMNDMEASUREi: measures taken vis-à-vis customers 
                 DMNDSHOCKi: demand shock 
                 SUPLYMSHOCKi: shock from main supplier 
                 SUPLYOTHRSHOCKi: shock from other suppliers 
                 MAINBSHOCKi: shock from main bank     
                 SCNDBSHOCKi: shock from second bank     
                 OTHRBSHOCKi: shock from other banks     
                 FIRMATTRBj,i : j-th firm attribute    m j , , 2 , 1    
                   u i: disturbance term
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Equation (1) examines the manner in which the SMEs take measures vis-à-vis their customers in 
                                                        
6 Subscript i indicates i-th firm.   11 
 
response to each type of shock. In estimating equation (1), we impose an a priori assumption that 
the SMEs cannot take counter measures vis-à-vis their customers immediately after the shock 
originates in the demand sector. In other words, it is assumed that the coefficient estimate of  1   is 
zero.
7 Each type of shock is expressed as a binary variable that takes a value of one if the shock 
hits the firm, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is also binary and takes a value of one if 
the measure is taken vis-à-vis customers, and zero otherwise.   
We use a similar method to regress the measures taken by the SMEs vis-à-vis their main 
suppliers (SUPLYMMEASURE), other suppliers (SUPLYOTHRMEASURE), their main banks 
(MAINBMEASURE), their second banks (SCNDBMEASURE), other banks (OTHRBMEASURE), 
public financial institutions (PUBFINMEASURE) and request for guaranteed loans 
(GUARNLMEASURE) against each type of shock, except for the originating shock.     
We use the following variables for the firm attributes: the number of financial institutions the 
firm has business relationship with (BANKRELATION), the logarithm of total assets (ASSETS), the 
debt-asset ratio (DEBT), the ratio of liquid assets (cash, deposit plus securities) to sales 
(LIQSALES), the ratio of ordinary profits to sales (PROFIT), firm age (AGE) and industry dummies 
(DUMIND).  
Before proceeding to estimation, we next discuss the endogeneity of the shocks. It seems 
natural to assume that the shocks that hit the SMEs precede the measures taken, but the shocks and 
the measures might be driven by the same unobservable exogenous factors. Therefore, we test for 
the endogeneity of the shocks statistically. The test is conducted in two steps. In the first step, the 
binary shock variables are regressed against the following exogenous variables, in addition to the 
explanatory variables of equation (1) by OLS.
8 The exogenous variables are a measure of 
dependence on the main bank (MAINBDEPEND), a measure of dependence on the main supplier 
(SUPLYMDEPEND), a trade relationship variable with the supplier and the customer (MONOP1, 
MONOP2), the proportion of loan outstanding from the main bank (MAINBLOANRATIO), the 
proportion of loan outstanding from the second bank (SCNDBLOANRATIO), and five dummy 
variables to represent the firm size of the main supplier as measured by the number of employees 
                                                        
7  The prior assumption that the SMEs cannot take the same type of measure as the type of 
originating shock is also made for the other types of measures.   
8  In other words, we estimate the linear probability model in the first step.   12 
 
(SUPLMSIZE1 to SUPLYMSIZE5). 
9  
In the second step, we estimate equation (1) using probit, adding the residuals from the first 
step as explanatory variables. Under the null hypothesis that the shocks are exogenous, the 
coefficient estimates of the residual variables should jointly be zero, which is tested by the Wald 
statistics.
10  The test statistics are shown in Table 7. The null hypothesis is not rejected for any types 
of shocks at the 5% level. Therefore, we treat the shocks as exogenous events prior to the measures 
t a k e n .           
Now we proceed to the estimation of equation (1) using probit. The marginal effects of each 
variable are shown in Table 8. The responses to demand shock, which is most the prevalent type of 
shock seen during the global financial crisis, are all significantly positive. It implies that the SMEs 
took every measure to cope with demand shock. The most frequent action taken was vis-à-vis 
suppliers. When a firm is hit by demand shock, the probability that the firm takes measures 
vis-à-vis its main and other suppliers is 0.1952 and 0.1721, respectively. Note that the measures 
taken vis-à-vis main and other suppliers are, in turn, demand shock from the viewpoint of the 
suppliers. In this way, a demand shock is propagated across firms to become a series of 
non-negligible aggregate demand shocks.   
The main bank and second bank also play an important role for firms coping with demand 
shock. The probability that the firm, when hit by demand shock, takes measures vis-à-vis its main 
bank or second bank is 0.1299 and 0.1205, respectively, followed by the probability that the firm 
requests guaranteed loans (0.0818). The probability that the firm takes measures vis-à-vis other 
banks and public financial institutions is significantly positive, but much smaller (0.0551 and 
                                                        
9 The MAINBDEPEND variable is a dummy variable that equals one when the respondent firm 
asks its main bank for help in the event of a temporary shortage of funds, and zero otherwise. The 
SUPLYMDEPEND variable is a dummy variable that equals one when the respondent firm asks its 
main supplier for help in the event of a temporary shortage of funds, and zero otherwise. These two 
variables are constructed from question 13 of the 2008 survey. The MONOP1 variable is a dummy 
variable that equals one when the respondent purchases intermediate goods from only her main 
supplier, and zero otherwise. This variable is constructed from question 10 of the 2008 survey. The 
MONOP2 variable is a dummy variable that equals one when the supplier sells intermediate goods 
to only the respondent firm, and zero otherwise. This variable is constructed from question 11 of 
the 2008 survey. The variables MAINBLOANRATIO and SCNDBLOANRATIO are constructed from 
question 17 and 18 of the 2009 survey. The variables of SUPSIZE1 to SUPSIZE5 are available in 
question 9 of the 2009 survey.         
10  See Rivers and Vuong (1988) for details of the endogeneity test. Wooldrige (2002) provides a 
good exposition about this approach in pp. 472-478.       13 
 
0.0440, respectively). When the financial sector is healthy enough to extend helping hands to their 
customers, the demand shocks become cushioned to some extent by the financial sector. 
The firms respond to supply shocks by taking measures vis-à-vis their customers and suppliers. 
When a supply shock comes from a main supplier, the firms will take measures vis-à-vis their 
customers and other suppliers. On the other hand, when a supply shock comes from other suppliers, 
the firms will take measures vis-à-vis their main suppliers. This reaction implies that the main and 
other customers are substitutes for each other. Note that the firms take no measures vis-à-vis 
financial institutions when they are hit by supply shocks.     
When firms are hit by shocks from their second banks and other banks, they primarily ask 
their main banks for help. In fact, the probability that the firms, hit by a financial shock from their 
second bank or other banks, take measures vis-à-vis their main banks is 0.0826 and 0.1453, 
respectively. However, when the firms are hit by a financial shock from their main banks, the 
probability that they request guaranteed loans is 0.0999, followed by the probability that they take 
measures vis-à-vis other banks, their customers and second banks (0.0853, 0.0792 and 0.0629, 
respectively).       
      As for the role of public financial institutions, it is only when the firms are hit by demand shock 
that they take measures vis-à-vis public financial institutions.   
     
4. Do Bank-firm Relationships and Customer-Supplier Relationships Matter when the SMEs 
Respond to Shocks? 
  In Section 2, we saw that the proportion of firms hit by each type of shock, and the firms that 
took measures vis-à-vis customers, suppliers and financial institutions, depended on the bank-firm 
relationship and the customer-supplier relationship. Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
response pattern to the shocks also depends on these relationships. In this section, we answer this 
question by estimating the response function to the shocks when considering the bank-firm 
relationship and the customer-supplier relationship. 
    We categorize the firms into four groups, divided by the length of bank-firm relationship. As 
defined in Section 2, the bank-firm relationship is considered as long (short) when it lasts more 
(less) than the median relationship length. The first group is the group of firms that have long 
bank-firm relationships with their main and second banks. The second group is the group of firms 14 
 
with short bank-firm relationships with their main and second banks. The firms in the second group 
are least the affiliated with their main and second banks. The third and fourth groups are a 
combination of the previous two. The third group is the group of firms with a long bank-firm 
relationship with their main bank, but a short bank-firm relationship with their second bank, while 
the fourth group is the group of firms with a short bank-firm relationship with their main bank, but 
a long bank-firm relationship with their second bank.   
   Equation (1) is estimated separately for the four firms groups that are defined above. The 
marginal effects are shown in Table 9. Panel A shows the estimation results for the first group of 
firms. When a firm is hit by demand shock, the firm takes measures vis-à-vis its suppliers, main 
bank and second bank. The firm does not seek help from other banks or public financial institutions. 
This is in strong contrast with the base case in the previous section, where the SMEs took every 
measure to cope with demand shock. When a firm is hit by a financial shock from its main bank, 
the firm seeks help only from its second bank. On the other hand, when a firm is hit by a financial 
shock from its second bank, the firm seeks help only from its main bank. This evidence indicates 
that the firms in the first group consider the main and second banks to be close substitutes for each 
other. The firms in this group rely primarily on their main banks by seeking help from their main 
banks in response to all types of shocks, except for those from their other suppliers. The importance 
of the main bank for the firms in this group is also confirmed when we compare the coefficient 
estimate of the DEBT variables in the response function between the firms with a long relationship 
with their main banks and those with a short relationship. The DEBT variable has a significantly 
positive effect on the measure vis-à-vis the main bank for the firms that have a long relationship 
with their main banks (Panels A and C), but not for the firms that have a short relationship with 
their main banks (Panels B and D). In other words, the firms with heavy debt burdens are more 
likely to seek help from their main banks if the firms have a close bank-firm relationship. In 
contrast, the firms in the first group do not seek help from other banks or public financial 
institutions  in  response  to  any  shocks.  They  also  do  not  request  guaranteed  loans.              
   Now we turn to the second group, where the firms are the least affiliated with their main or 
second banks. The marginal effects are shown in Panel B of Table 9. All of the responses to demand 
shock are significantly positive, which implies that the SMEs that are the least affiliated with their 
main and second banks take every measure to cope with demand shock. The probability that they 15 
 
ask their main and other suppliers for help in response to a demand shock (0.2181 and 0.2244) is 
much higher than the corresponding probability for the firms in the first group (0.1733 and 0.1266). 
This finding shows that business-to-business transactions play a more vital role in cushioning 
demand shocks when the bank-firm relationship is weak.   
This relationship also held true for the firms in the third and fourth groups, as is seen from Panel 
C and D of Table 9. Almost all of the responses to a demand shock are significantly positive, which 
implies that the SMEs in the third and fourth groups also take every measure to cope with a demand 
shock. No response to a financial shock from the main bank or the second bank is significant for 
the firms in the third and fourth groups, indicating that the firms have nowhere to seek help when 
they are hit by a financial shock from their main banks or second banks.   
   The estimation results so far indicate that the measures taken by the SMEs in response to 
shocks hinge crucially upon the bank-firm relationship.
11  Next, we examine whether we observe a 
similar response pattern for the customer-supplier relationship. As defined in Section 2, the 
customer-supplier relationship is considered long (short) when the relationship with the main 
supplier lasts more (less) than the median relationship length. Panel A of Table 10 shows the 
marginal effects of equation (1) for the firm group with a long customer-supplier relationship, while 
Panel B shows the marginal effects for the firm group with a short customer-supplier relationship. It 
is reasonable to expect that, when the customer-supplier relationship is strong, the main supplier 
will play an active role in helping the SMEs that are hit by shocks. However, a comparison of the 
second column of Panels A and B reveals that there is little evidence that the marginal effects for 
the firms with a long customer-supplier relationship are larger than for firms with a short 
customer-supplier relationship. Thus, the length of the customer-supplier relationship is not related 
to the pattern of measures taken in response to shocks.   
      It is also reasonable to expect that a supply shock from a main supplier will have a much larger 
impact on firms with a long customer-supplier relationship, and, hence, the probability that they 
take measures in response to the supply shock from a main supplier will be larger. But we find little 
                                                        
11  As an alternative measure of the bank-firm relationship, we classified the firms, based on the 
loan ratio of the main and second banks, into four groups of firms. We then repeated the estimation 
exercise above for each firm group. We could not detect any association in the pattern of the 
measures taken by the SMEs in response to shocks with the bank-firm relationship defined by the 
loan ratio. See the Appendix Tables for the full estimation results.             16 
 
difference in the pattern of the measures taken in response to a supply shock from the main 
supplier.  
    To sum up, the pattern of measures taken by the SMEs in response to a variety of shocks 
depends more upon the bank-firm relationship than upon the customer-supplier relationship. The 
result is that the strength of the bank-firm relationship is important in understanding the 
propagation mechanism for shocks that hit SMEs across firms.               
 
5. Concluding Remarks     
We examined the nature of the shocks that hit the SMEs in Japan during the global financial 
crisis and how they responded to these shocks, based on the unique surveys conducted by the 
RIETI in 2008 and 2009. We could successfully identify the shocks as demand, supply and 
financial shocks. Demand shock was the most prevalent among the shocks that hit the SMEs, while 
the financial shock was least frequent. The SMEs took a spectrum of measures against demand 
shock by seeking help from their suppliers, from private and from public financial institutions. We 
find that the pattern of measures taken by the SMEs crucially hinged on the bank-firm relationship, 
but not on the customer-supplier relationship. The SMEs that had a close affiliation with financial 
institutions measured by the length of their relationship asked those financial institutions for help, 
while the SMEs that were less affiliated with financial institutions primarily sought help from their 
suppliers.  
Several important implications for recovering from the Great East Japan Earthquake from the 
standpoint of the SMES emerge from our study. First, a stable, long-term relationship between 
SMEs and their financial institutions can cushion the propagation of shocks across sectors. 
However, we should bear in mind that financial institutions can only afford to buffer the shocks that 
hit SMEs if they, themselves, are healthy. Therefore capital injection to financial institutions in the 
disaster-stricken area under Cabinet Office Ordinance on Special Measures for Strengthening 
Financial Function would be quite useful in strengthening the role of financial institutions as buffer 
against the shocks. Second, we find that the existence of alternative suppliers might alleviate the 
supply shock. The upshot is that decentralizing the supply chain might mitigate the shocks on 
production line considerably. Third, loans from public financial institutions and/or with a credit 




Aoki,M. and H.T. Patrick (1994). The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing 
and Transforming Economies, Oxford University Press.    
Bernanke,B.S. (1986). “Alternative Explanations of the Money-Income Correlation,” 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 25 (1), pp. 49-99.   
Blanchard, O.J. and D. Quah (1989). “The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply 
Disturbances,” American Economic Review 79, pp. 655-73.   
 
Gali, J. (1999). “Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks 
Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?” American Economic Review 89, pp.249-271.     
Hoshi,T. and A.Kashyap (2004). Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the 
Future, MIT Press. 
Rivers, D. and Q. Vuong (1988). “Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for 
Simultaneous Probit Models,” Journal of Econometrics 39, pp.347-366. 
 
Sims, C. A. (1986). “Are forecasting models usable for policy analysis?” Quarterly Review of 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Winter, pp. 2-16. 
 
Uesugi, I, Uchida, H., Ogura, Y., Ono, A., Xu Peng, Turuta, D., Nemoto, T., Hirata, H., Yasuda, Y., 
Yamori,N., Watanabe, W. and M. Hotei (2009). “The Current Status of SME Financing under the 
Financial Crisis: A summary of the Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and 
Financial Institutions (Feb. 2008) and the Survey on the Status of Transactions between 
Businesses and Financial Institutions following the Financial Crisis (Feb. 2009),” Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, DP 09-J-020 (in Japanese). 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press.    
Notes: GDP real growth rate compared to the same quarter the previous year 


































Figure 1 GDP Real Growth Rate   
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Figure 3-1 Sales Growth Rate by Firm Size: 
Manufacturing Sector   
Small firms Medium-sized firms Large firms 
Notes: Sales growth rate compared to the same quarter the previous year 
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Figure 3-2 Sales Growth Rate by Firm Size: 
Non-manufacturing Sector  
Small firms Medium-sized firms Large firms 
Table 1 Proportion of Firms Hit by Each Type of Shock 
   
   
 
type of shock 
 
proportion     number    
   of           of 
  firms      observations 
proportion of firms 
small                  large            difference 
firms               firms 
demand shock 
supply shock from main supplier 
supply shock from other suppliers 
financial shock from main bank 
financial shock from second bank 
financial shock from other banks   
  82.8%       4,030 
  35.6%       3,971 
  36.7%       3,903 
  18.9%       3,680               
  17.1%       3,281 
    16.5%       3,057 
83.2%             82.5%             0.7 
40.6%             33.2%             7.3*** 
40.5%             34.9%             5.6*** 
18.6%             19.0%            -0.4     
17.1%             17.1%             0.0   
12.8%             18.1%            -5.3*** 
  Notes: *** significant at the 1% level 
Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.   
  
Table 2 Proportion of Firms Hit by Each Type of Shock and Length of Bank-firm Relationship and Customer-Supplier Relationship 
 
   
 
type of shock 
 
proportion of firms 
short         long 
bank-firm      bank-firm     difference 
relationship    relationship 
short               long   
customer-supplier    customer-supplier    difference 
relationship          relationship 
demand shock 
supply shock from main supplier 
supply shock from other suppliers 
financial shock from main bank 
financial shock from second bank 
financial shock from other banks 
  83.2%       82.5%        0.7     
  35.7%       35.5%         0.2    
  36.8%       36.6%        0.2    
  20.6%       17.5%         3.2***                 
  19.3%       15.3%        4.0***   
  18.0%       15.4%         2.6*   
83.4%            82.3%          1.1 
36.0%            35.3%          0.7 
37.4%            36.2%          1.1 
20.3%            18.0%           2.3* 
18.7%             16.1%          2.6* 
17.4%            15.9%          1.5 
  Notes: ***, * significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively 
The bank-firm relationship is long (short) when the bank-firm relationship is longer (shorter) than the sample median (30 years).     
  The customer-supplier relationship is long (short) when the customer-supplier relationship is longer (shorter) than the sample median (26 years).     
Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.   
  
Table 3 Correlation Coefficient between Occurrence of Each Type of Shock   
 
   
 
Type of shock 
demand    supply       supply       financial     financial      financial 
  shock    shock from   shock  from    shock  from    shock  from    shock  from 
            main       other            main         second       other   
supplier      suppliers        bank          bank        banks 
demand shock 
supply shock from main supplier 
supply shock from other suppliers 
financial shock from main bank 
financial shock from second bank 
financial shock from other banks 
  1.000   
  0.168      1.000 
  0.182      0.725        1.000 
  0.081      0.162        0.145        1.000 
  0.081      0.148        0.147         0.647         1.000 
  0.100      0.109        0.133        0.507         0.618        1.000     
  Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.   
  
Table 4 Proportion of Firms That Took Each Type of Measures in Response to Shocks   
 
   
 
type of measure 
proportion      number 
   of               of 
firms          observations 
proportion of firms 
small               large            difference 
firms               firms   
measure vis-à-vis customers 
measure vis-à-vis main supplier     
measure vis-à-vis other suppliers 
measure vis-à-vis main bank   
measure vis-à-vis second bank 
measure vis-à-vis other banks 
measure vis-à-vis public financial     
institutions 
measure to request for 
guaranteed loans   
  42.8%          4,008 
  34.2%          3,961 
  31.3%          3,874 
  32.2%          3,889 
  17.9%          3,889 
  10.3%          3,889 
   8.3%          3,889 
 
  18.2%          4,103   
 
     44.8%               41.9%            2.9* 
     34.8%               33.9%            0.9 
     31.5%               31.2%            0.3    
     31.0%               32.8%           -1.9 
     14.7%               19.3%           -4.6*** 
      6.5%               12.0%           -5.6*** 
      8.4%                8.2%            0.2 
 
     20.8%               17.0%            3.8***     
  Notes: ***, * significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively 
Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.   
  
Table 5 Proportion of Firms That Took Each Type of Measures in Response to Shocks and   
Length of Bank-firm Relationship and Customer-supplier Relationship 
 
   
type of measure 
 
proportion of firms 
short         long 
bank-firm      bank-firm     difference 
relationship    relationship 
short               long   
customer-supplier    customer-supplier    difference 
relationship          relationship 
measure vis-à-vis customers 
measure vis-à-vis main supplier     
measure vis-à-vis other suppliers 
measure vis-à-vis main bank   
measure vis-à-vis second bank 
measure vis-à-vis other banks 
measure vis-à-vis public financial     
institutions 
measure to request for guaranteed 
loans 
  43.0%       42.6%        0.5     
  35.7%       33.0%         2.7*   
  32.0%       30.8%        1.2    
  35.4%       29.8%         5.5***                 
  19.8%       16.5%        3.3***   
  11.2%         9.6%         1.6*   
   9.5%        7.4%        2.0** 
 
  23.9%       14.0%        9.9*** 
42.3%            43.1%           -0.8 
36.1%            32.8%          3.3** 
33.6%            29.8%          3.8** 
33.1%            31.7%           1.4   
17.1%             18.5%          -1.4   
10.0%            10.5%         -0.5 
  8.3%             8.3%          0.0 
 
21.4%            16.0%          5.5*** 
  See the notes in Table 2. ***, **,* significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.    
Table 6 Correlation Coefficient between Each Type of Response to Shocks   
 
   
 
type of measure 
measure      measure      measure      measure     measure    measure    measure          measure 
vis-à-vis     vis-à-vis     vis-à-vis      vis-à-vis     vis-à-vis     vis-à-vis     vis-à-vis        to request 
customer     main       other       main       second      other        public            for 
supplier   suppliers      bank         bank       banks     institutions  guaranteed loans   
measure vis-à-vis customers 
measure vis-à-vis main supplier     
measure vis-à-vis other suppliers 
measure vis-à-vis main bank   
measure vis-à-vis second bank 
measure vis-à-vis other banks 
measure vis-à-vis public financial     
institutions 
measure to request for guaranteed 
loans   
  1.000   
  0.273      1.000 
  0.277      0.859       1.000 
  0.104      0.180        0.171        1.000 
  0.099      0.148       0.153        0.443       1.000 
  0.074      0.106       0.115        0.272       0.343       1.000     
  0.092      0.127       0.123        0.141       0.158       0.141       1.000 
 
  0.096      0.142       0.131        0.251       0.174       0.101       0.230       1.000 
  Data source: The Survey on the Status of Transactions between Businesses and Financial Institutions Following   
  the Financial Crisis, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.   
  





measure vis-à-vis customers 
measure vis-à-vis main supplier     
measure vis-à-vis other suppliers 
measure vis-à-vis main bank   
measure vis-à-vis second bank 
measure vis-à-vis other banks 
measure vis-à-vis public financial     
institutions 
measure to request for guaranteed 
loans 
        9.15    (0.103) 
        4.43    (0.489) 
        4.07    (0.540) 
        9.14    (0.104)   
        7.07    (0.216) 
       10.18* (0.070) 
       11.13* (0.085) 
 
        2.48    (0.871)   
  Notes: The test statistics is distributed as chi-squared with degree of freedom 5 
for measures vis-à-vis customers, main supplier, other suppliers,   
main bank, second bank and other banks and degree of freedom 6 for 
measure vis-à-vis public financial institutions and that to request   
for guaranteed loans. 
        The number in parenthesis is p-value.  * significant at the 10% level   





DMND      SUPLYM   SUPLYOTHR  MAINB    SCNDB     OTHRB      PUBFIN     GUARNL 













             0.1952***     0.1721***     0.1299***     0.1205***    0.0551***     0.0440***     0.0818*** 
             (7.08)         (6.28)         (4.49)        (5.49)        (3.93)         (3.87)        (4.38) 
0.2015***                  0.1934***     0.0434        0.0221      -0.0016         0.0112        0.0127 
(5.49)                   (7.55)       (1.21)      (0.75)      (-0.08)       (0.66)       (0.49)     
-0.0281     0.1351***               0.0292       0.0213     0.0047       0.0005     -0.0071 
(-0.77)      (5.41)                   (0.84)       (0.74)      (0.25)       (0.03)      (-0.28) 
0.0792*     0.0575      0.0011                  0.0629**    0.0853***   0.0271      0.0999*** 
(1.85)       (1.41)      (0.03)                   (2.00)       (3.02)       (1.38)      (3.05) 
0.0278      0.0774*     0.0740      0.0826**                0.0246      0.0307      0.0326 
(0.58)       (1.67)      (1.60)       (2.04)                   (1.07)       (1.37)      (1.03)   
0.0466      0.0504      0.0925**    0.1453***   0.0696**                0.0318      0.0647** 













0.0122     -0.0244**   -0.0012       0.0002      0.0076      0.0133**    -0.0246***    -0.0587***   
(1.18)       (-2.47)     (-0.13)       (0.02)       (0.91)       (2.39)       (-5.14)      (-7.83)   
0.0711     -0.0573     -0.0459       0.3038***   0.2297***   0.0808**     0.0824***    0.2618*** 
(1.11)      (-0.93)      (-0.75)       (4.96)       (4.40)       (2.29)       (2.89)      (5.73) 
-0.1684*    -0.1415     -0.1956**     0.0065      0.0274      -0.0510       -0.0539     -0.0446 
(-1.79)     (-1.53)      (-2.12)       (0.07)       (0.34)       (-0.87)      (-1.13)      (-0.61) 
-0.3355     0.1953     0.2389       -0.1063     -0.1050      -0.0341       -0.1126      -0.6044*** 
(-1.30)      (0.79)      (0.98)       (-0.44)      (-0.51)       (-0.25)       (-1.02)       (-3.38)   
-0.0260    -0.0174     -0.0435*      0.0284     -0.0120       -0.0212     0.0436***    0.0185 
(-0.95)     (-0.67)      (-1.68)       (1.10)      (-0.56)        (-1.47)     (3.38)       (0.99)   
-0.0018    0.0166***   0.0114**     0.0127**    0.0192***    0.0198***   0.0112***   0.0198***   
(-0.33)     (3.25)       (2.28)       (2.50)       (4.61)        (7.48)      (4.85)        (5.18) 
number of observations 
pseudo R-squared   
1747      1736        1735        1734        1747        1859        1727       1746   
0.0515     0.0679      0.0799       0.0866      0.0943       0.1667      0.1387      0.1867  
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 




Table 9 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel A
The Firm Group with Long Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Second Bank 
explanatory equations
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.1733*** 0.1266*** 0.1159*** 0.0954*** 0.0367 0.0135 0.0165
(4.17) (2.89) (2.76) (2.88) (1.62) (0.78) (0.62)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2442*** 0.2109*** 0.1034** 0.0354 0.0274 0.0244 0.0518
(4.67) (5.46) (2.03) (0.84) (0.88) (1.09) (1.56)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.0789 0.0890** -0.0332 0.0053 -0.0326 -0.0196 -0.0352
(-1.53) (2.44) (-0.72) (0.14) (-1.28) (-1.15) (-1.37)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0660 0.0166 -0.0170 0.0944* 0.0284 0.0515 0.0743*
(1.02) (0.28) (-0.29) (1.95) (0.82) (1.61) (1.86)
SCNDBSHOCK -0.0733 0.0093 -0.0408 0.1166* 0.0579 0.0122 0.0432
(-1.00) (0.13) (-0.62) (1.85) (1.40) (0.45) (1.02)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0606 0.1081* 0.1488** 0.1003* 0.0439 0.0041 0.0379
(0.92) (1.69) (2.29) (1.67) (0.97) (0.18) (1.01)
ASSETS 0.0199 -0.0292** 0.0003 -0.0062 0.0110 0.0151* -0.0201*** -0.0495***
(1.36) (-2.10) (0.02) (-0.45) (0.96) (1.89) (-3.45) (-5.88)
DEBT 0.1160 0.0458 0.0630 0.3603*** 0.2878*** 0.1171** 0.0780** 0.1913***
(1.31) (0.54) (0.75) (4.42) (4.10) (2.44) (2.32) (3.91)
LIQSALES -0.0615 -0.1367 -0.1790 0.1641 0.1507 0.0748 0.0084 -0.0675
(-0.46) (-1.01) (-1.31) (1.29) (1.31) (0.93) (0.14) (-0.76)
PROFIT -0.9187** 0.0984 0.0290 -0.2842 -0.1740 -0.0498 -0.1025 -0.5205**
(-2.23) (0.26) (0.08) (-0.80) (-0.56) (-0.23) (-0.68) (-2.29)
AGE -0.0639 -0.0103 -0.0830* 0.0685 -0.0708* -0.0259 0.0572** 0.0265
(-1.22) (-0.21) (-1.72) (1.39) (-1.81) (-0.95) (2.30) (0.90)
BANKRELATION 0.0037 0.0202*** 0.0143** 0.0205*** 0.0202*** 0.0178*** 0.0102*** 0.0128***
(0.51) (2.93) (2.13) (3.04) (3.69) (4.87) (3.90) (3.09)
number of observations 817 811 814 810 802 848 798 817
pseudo R-squared  0.0516 0.0616 0.0826 0.1142 0.1187 0.1777 0.1575 0.2110 
 
Table 9 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel B
The Firm Group with Short Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Second Bank 
explanatory equations
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.2181*** 0.2244*** 0.1153** 0.0941** 0.0698*** 0.0448** 0.1263***
(4.32) (4.91) (2.07) (2.01) (2.88) (2.25) (2.81)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.1036 0.1686*** -0.0446 -0.0389 -0.0154 -0.0094 0.0151
(1.39) (3.47) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.40) (-0.31) (0.23)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK 0.0527 0.1631*** 0.0713 0.0805 0.0167 0.0144 0.0177
(0.71) (3.36) (0.98) (1.22) (0.40) (0.42) (0.27)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0866 0.0771 -0.0474 0.0672 0.1771*** 0.0245 0.1141
(1.06) (0.96) (-0.66) (1.10) (2.80) (0.72) (1.54)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.1159 0.2091** 0.3052*** -0.0039 0.0045 0.0303 -0.0010
(1.29) (2.36) (3.42) (-0.05) (0.12) (0.78) (-0.01)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0468 -0.0074 0.0255 0.2328*** 0.0755 0.0888* 0.1692**
(0.57) (-0.10) (0.34) (2.91) (1.18) (1.81) (2.24)
ASSETS -0.0071 0.0151 0.0242 0.0169 0.0285 0.0192* -0.0138 -0.0580***
(-0.34) (0.75) (1.23) (0.84) (1.62) (1.69) (-1.41) (-2.97)
DEBT 0.0264 -0.1971 -0.2384* 0.1022 0.2657** 0.0299 0.1078* 0.2776**
(0.20) (-1.51) (-1.87) (0.78) (2.30) (0.40) (1.75) (2.32)
LIQSALES -0.3478* -0.2609 -0.2472 -0.3156* -0.1955 -0.1483 -0.2268** -0.0791
(-1.80) (-1.38) (-1.32) (-1.72) (-1.22) (-1.29) (-2.11) (-0.45)
PROFIT 0.5480 0.2027 0.3331 -0.2064 -0.0797 -0.0504 0.0746 -0.6514*
(1.30) (0.52) (0.88) (-0.52) (-0.23) (-0.25) (0.40) (-1.84)
AGE -0.0234 -0.0643 -0.0780* -0.0085 0.0148 -0.0307 0.0421** -0.0218
(-0.53) (-1.49) (-1.84) (-0.20) (0.39) (-1.27) (2.15) (-0.56)
BANKRELATION -0.0182* 0.0028 0.0008 0.0014 0.0058 0.0242*** 0.0070 0.0266***
(-1.67) (0.27) (0.08) (0.14) (0.65) (4.60) (1.55) (2.79)
number of observations 505 500 497 503 503 544 500 504
pseudo R-squared  0.0682 0.0995 0.1158 0.0701 0.0709 0.2150 0.2267 0.1718 
 
 
Table 9 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel C
The Firm Group with Long Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Short Bank-firm Relationship with Second Bank 
explanatory equations
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.2710*** 0.1894* 0.2254** 0.2146*** 0.1588***
(2.91) (1.86) (2.03) (3.74) (3.11)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2778** 0.2443*** -0.2887** 0.0086 -0.2232** 0.0067 -0.1287
(2.14) (2.75) (-1.98) (0.08) (-2.30) (0.08) (-1.33)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.0335 0.2584*** 0.3124** 0.0689 0.2179** 0.0618 0.1537
(-0.24) (2.85) (1.99) (0.64) (2.12) (0.69) (1.35)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0879 0.1196 0.1863 -0.0199 0.0915 -0.0013 0.0597
(0.54) (0.79) (1.20) (-0.19) (0.79) (-0.02) (0.51)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.2240 0.0126 -0.0626 0.0792 -0.0494 0.0178 0.0206
(1.47) (0.09) (-0.44) (0.53) (-0.82) (0.19) (0.19)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.1443 0.1229 0.1829 0.3926*** 0.2106 0.1777 -0.0259
(0.89) (0.79) (1.13) (2.81) (1.52) (1.38) (-0.28)
ASSETS 0.1445*** 0.0129 0.0184 0.0432 0.0144 -0.0028 -0.0395 -0.0202
(3.08) (0.32) (0.46) (1.01) (0.42) (-0.11) (-1.35) (-0.66)
DEBT 0.2064 -0.2296 -0.2512 0.8836*** 0.0653 0.2359 0.1290 0.5882**
(0.73) (-0.82) (-0.91) (2.88) (0.28) (1.25) (0.63) (2.50)
LIQSALES -0.6148* -0.1507 -0.7982** 0.1535 0.2223 -0.2673 0.0322 0.0172
(-1.66) (-0.43) (-2.05) (0.40) (0.76) (-0.94) (0.13) (0.06)
PROFIT -2.1755 0.5498 0.6751 2.0859 1.3597 0.8870 0.8637 -2.3446**
(-1.37) (0.41) (0.50) (1.37) (1.21) (0.95) (0.98) (-2.09)
AGE -0.3293* -0.0751 -0.0219 -0.0278 -0.0135 -0.0153 0.0721 0.0537
(-1.74) (-0.45) (-0.13) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.14) (0.62) (0.44)
BANKRELATION -0.0218 -0.0007 -0.0103 -0.0322 0.0328** 0.0196* 0.0132 0.0180
(-0.95) (-0.03) (-0.49) (-1.47) (1.97) (1.72) (0.99) (1.16)
number of observations 156 151 149 154 149 134 126 149
pseudo R-squared  0.1918 0.1705 0.155 0.2147 0.1601 0.2429 0.1557 0.1922 
Table 9 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel D
The Firm Group with Short Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Long Bank-firm Relationship with Second Bank 
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.2086*** 0.2202*** 0.1891*** 0.1811*** 0.0431 0.0629** 0.1677***
(2.99) (3.48) (3.06) (5.45) (1.32) (2.46) (5.12)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2568*** 0.1958*** 0.1588* 0.1299* 0.0737 -0.0120 -0.0600
(2.64) (2.83) (1.76) (1.74) (1.43) (-0.29) (-1.06)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.1262 0.1716** 0.0444 -0.0410 0.0040 0.0236 -0.0039
(-1.30) (2.56) (0.54) (-0.70) (0.10) (0.52) (-0.06)
MAINBSHOCK 0.1158 0.0489 0.0036 0.0305 0.1117 -0.0065 0.1530
(1.07) (0.46) (0.04) (0.44) (1.42) (-0.16) (1.63)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.0775 0.1306 0.0866 0.1022 -0.0238 0.0735 0.0984
(0.64) (1.08) (0.77) (1.00) (-0.61) (0.97) (0.99)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.1094 -0.0154 0.0523 0.2048 0.0965 -0.0012 -0.0132
(0.83) (-0.13) (0.43) (1.59) (0.98) (-0.02) (-0.18)
ASSETS -0.0127 -0.1035*** -0.0657** -0.0122 -0.0183 0.0139 -0.0412*** -0.0760***
(-0.39) (-3.28) (-2.13) (-0.41) (-0.78) (0.94) (-3.05) (-3.51)
DEBT -0.1537 -0.2063 -0.0806 0.2430 0.1381 0.0256 0.0793 0.2224*
(-0.84) (-1.25) (-0.50) (1.47) (1.15) (0.32) (1.04) (1.83)
LIQSALES 0.0623 -0.0038 0.0461 0.0455 0.0517 -0.2644* 0.0039 -0.0430
(0.23) (-0.02) (0.19) (0.20) (0.29) (-1.75) (0.04) (-0.25)
PROFIT -1.2718 0.4155 0.8550 0.5559 -0.4125 -0.5417 -0.5943* -0.5529
(-1.49) (0.54) (1.16) (0.73) (-0.72) (-1.37) (-1.77) (-1.02)
AGE -0.0416 0.0523 0.0408 0.1102 0.0865 0.0408 0.0036 0.1535**
(-0.50) (0.68) (0.54) (1.46) (1.47) (1.00) (0.10) (2.48)
BANKRELATION 0.0312 0.0439** 0.0384** 0.0277 0.0367*** 0.0169** 0.0147* 0.0211
(1.63) (2.35) (2.10) (1.64) (2.84) (2.22) (1.68) (1.62)
number of observations 253 259 258 260 267 270 250 245
pseudo R-squared  0.0951 0.1095 0.1079 0.1501 0.1985 0.2131 0.1725 0.2398
See the notes in Table 8.The variable DMNDSHOCK in Panel C predicts zero perfectly in OTHRBMEASURE and PUBFINMEASURE equations





Table 10 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel A
The Firm Group with Long Customer-supplier Relationship
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.1940*** 0.1604*** 0.1608*** 0.1371*** 0.0722*** 0.0445*** 0.0750***
(5.79) (4.80) (4.60) (5.31) (4.87) (3.24) (3.38)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2500*** 0.1971*** 0.0271 0.0052 -0.0103 0.0287 0.0112
(5.32) (6.12) (0.60) (0.14) (-0.44) (1.25) (0.35)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.1024** 0.1392*** 0.0372 0.0114 0.0003 -0.0214 -0.0166
(-2.19) (4.44) (0.84) (0.32) (0.01) (-1.15) (-0.55)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0540 0.0616 0.0298 0.0577 0.0720** 0.0309 0.1039***
(1.01) (1.23) (0.61) (1.49) (2.20) (1.26) (2.60)
SCNDBSHOCK -0.0034 0.0405 0.0166 0.0822 0.0114 0.0334 0.0427
(-0.06) (0.73) (0.31) (1.64) (0.44) (1.20) (1.09)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0717 0.0374 0.0866* 0.1265** 0.0338 0.0297 0.0473
(1.29) (0.72) (1.65) (2.38) (0.85) (1.12) (1.22)
ASSETS 0.0135 -0.0189 0.0074 -0.0092 0.0045 0.0151** -0.0253*** -0.0656***
(1.02) (-1.55) (0.62) (-0.73) (0.43) (2.20) (-4.21) (-7.13)
DEBT 0.0646 -0.0345 -0.0164 0.3349*** 0.2640*** 0.1393*** 0.0851** 0.2436***
(0.80) (-0.45) (-0.22) (4.33) (4.02) (3.19) (2.39) (4.44)
LIQSALES -0.1954 -0.1878 -0.2905** -0.0288 0.0150 -0.0255 -0.0520 -0.1878*
(-1.61) (-1.53) (-2.36) (-0.24) (0.14) (-0.34) (-0.84) (-1.96)
PROFIT -0.2713 0.6015 0.6351* 0.0762 -0.3725 0.1384 -0.2565 -0.7912***
(-0.68) (1.54) (1.65) (0.21) (-1.18) (0.66) (-1.50) (-2.80)
AGE -0.0115 -0.0215 -0.0450 0.0889** -0.0259 0.0047 0.0492** 0.0382
(-0.26) (-0.52) (-1.12) (2.10) (-0.76) (0.21) (2.38) (1.32)
BANKRELATION 0.0021 0.0177*** 0.0091 0.0155** 0.0213*** 0.0173*** 0.0121*** 0.0127***
(0.31) (2.80) (1.51) (2.41) (4.05) (5.29) (4.19) (2.65)
number of observations 1103 1093 1094 1093 1106 1157 1090 1103
pseudo R-squared  0.0536 0.0705 0.0851 0.0923 0.1023 0.1727 0.1512 0.2012 
 
Table 10 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks: Panel B
The Firm Group with Short Customer-supplier Relationship
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.1991*** 0.1978*** 0.0833 0.1044*** 0.0212 0.0332* 0.0921***
(4.10) (4.15) (1.61) (2.71) (0.73) (1.70) (2.81)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.1421** 0.1994*** 0.0512 0.0632 0.0109 -0.0225 0.0079
(2.36) (4.61) (0.89) (1.26) (0.34) (-1.02) (0.18)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK 0.0875 0.1352*** 0.0325 0.0276 0.0107 0.0450 0.0059
(1.48) (3.22) (0.58) (0.58) (0.34) (1.57) (0.14)
MAINBSHOCK 0.1280* 0.0487 -0.0536 0.0638 0.1026** 0.0242 0.0839
(1.74) (0.68) (-0.79) (1.21) (2.03) (0.78) (1.47)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.1009 0.1573* 0.2058** 0.0553 0.0460 0.0136 0.0183
(1.20) (1.89) (2.46) (0.81) (1.07) (0.42) (0.33)
OTHRBSHOCK -0.0210 0.0520 0.0700 0.2029*** 0.1168** 0.0509 0.0758
(-0.28) (0.72) (0.95) (2.82) (2.05) (1.38) (1.37)
ASSETS 0.0032 -0.0415** -0.0182 0.0137 0.0127 0.0080 -0.0190** -0.0418***
(0.18) (-2.42) (-1.06) (0.84) (0.91) (0.85) (-2.53) (-3.13)
DEBT 0.0579 -0.1169 -0.1141 0.2936*** 0.1755** -0.0015 0.0901** 0.3023***
(0.54) (-1.13) (-1.09) (2.89) (2.04) (-0.03) (2.04) (3.75)
LIQSALES -0.1018 -0.0887 -0.0902 -0.0119 0.0415 -0.0920 -0.0487 0.1384
(-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.08) (0.34) (-0.98) (-0.71) (1.21)
PROFIT -0.3792 -0.0030 0.0991 -0.2655 0.1015 -0.1503 -0.0544 -0.5420**
(-1.09) (-0.01) (0.29) (-0.81) (0.37) (-0.87) (-0.40) (-2.19)
AGE -0.0151 0.0216 0.0166 -0.0250 -0.0090 -0.0344 0.0302* -0.0192
(-0.38) (0.56) (0.43) (-0.68) (-0.29) (-1.64) (1.78) (-0.67)
BANKRELATION -0.0066 0.0152* 0.0140 0.0066 0.0156** 0.0228*** 0.0077** 0.0291***
(-0.72) (1.72) (1.58) (0.79) (2.24) (5.16) (2.18) (4.47)
number of observations 644 643 641 641 641 702 637 643
pseudo R-squared  0.0745 0.0806 0.0993 0.1018 0.1014 0.1893 0.1624 0.1956
See the notes in Table 8 
 
 Appendix Table
Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks under Alternative Measure of Bank-firm Relationship: Panel A
The Firm Group with Long Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Second Bank 
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.1437*** 0.1047** 0.0193 0.0483 0.0050 0.0113 0.0864***
(2.86) (2.06) (0.38) (1.57) (0.42) (0.60) (3.42)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2258*** 0.1619*** 0.0034 0.0923* -0.0081 0.0061 0.0040
(3.22) (3.52) (0.06) (1.91) (-0.64) (0.25) (0.10)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.0746 0.1068** 0.0922 -0.0715** 0.0076 -0.0154 0.0019
(-1.07) (2.36) (1.54) (-2.06) (0.52) (-0.74) (0.05)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0795 0.0692 -0.0065 0.0897 0.0659* 0.0416 0.1826***
(0.94) (0.87) (-0.09) (1.60) (1.66) (1.09) (2.59)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.1396 0.0753 0.0223 0.0923 -0.0058 0.0281 0.0014
(1.43) (0.80) (0.25) (1.17) (-0.51) (0.76) (0.03)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0952 0.1741* 0.1672* 0.1796** 0.0110 0.0104 0.0417
(1.00) (1.86) (1.74) (2.05) (0.23) (0.35) (0.77)
ASSETS 0.0223 -0.0319* -0.0176 -0.0095 -0.0167 0.0052 -0.0171*** -0.0367***
(1.22) (-1.85) (-1.03) (-0.62) (-1.52) (1.23) (-2.59) (-3.17)
DEBT -0.0027 -0.1442 -0.0706 0.1285 0.0355 0.0225 0.0487 0.1606**
(-0.03) (-1.41) (-0.71) (1.41) (0.55) (0.97) (1.42) (2.53)
LIQSALES -0.2309* -0.2132 -0.2237 -0.1525 -0.1710* -0.0667 -0.0271 -0.1320
(-1.65) (-1.53) (-1.61) (-1.21) (-1.69) (-1.62) (-0.47) (-1.21)
PROFIT -0.3759 0.0030 -0.0240 -0.3597 -0.2292 -0.1549* -0.0503 -0.2929
(-0.92) (0.01) (-0.06) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-1.90) (-0.44) (-1.33)
AGE -0.0469 -0.0193 -0.0508 0.0405 0.0767** -0.0111 0.0049 -0.0011
(-0.97) (-0.43) (-1.16) (1.00) (2.50) (-1.12) (0.32) (-0.04)
BANKRELATION -0.0075 0.0227** 0.0159 0.0317*** 0.0303*** 0.0075*** 0.0086** 0.0173***
(-0.66) (2.19) (1.56) (3.41) (4.87) (2.94) (2.56) (2.69)
number of observations 545 531 526 538 539 577 526 534
pseudo R-squared  0.0711 0.0809 0.0753 0.1425 0.1664 0.3039 0.1604 0.2066 
 
 Appendix Table
 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks under Alternative Measure of Bank-firm Relationship: Panel B
The Firm Group with Short Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Second Bank 
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.2221*** 0.2299*** 0.2152*** 0.1827*** 0.0651 -0.0016 0.1175***
(3.43) (3.77) (3.80) (3.72) (1.27) (-0.04) (2.93)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.1395 0.2226*** 0.0684 -0.0218 0.0080 0.0137 -0.0768
(1.58) (3.47) (0.81) (-0.31) (0.13) (0.30) (-1.38)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK 0.0111 0.1939*** -0.0023 0.0695 0.0537 -0.0051 0.0065
(0.13) (3.30) (-0.03) (0.97) (0.87) (-0.12) (0.10)
MAINBSHOCK 0.1506* -0.0624 -0.1416* 0.0017 0.0309 0.0013 0.0509
(1.68) (-0.72) (-1.74) (0.03) (0.46) (0.03) (0.73)
SCNDBSHOCK -0.0086 0.2639*** 0.3210*** 0.0678 0.1343* 0.0985 0.0503
(-0.09) (2.68) (3.24) (0.82) (1.68) (1.48) (0.69)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0172 -0.0287 0.0280 0.2174*** 0.1984*** 0.0391 0.1391**
(0.21) (-0.36) (0.35) (2.82) (2.81) (0.88) (2.02)
ASSETS -0.0112 -0.0036 0.0155 0.0022 0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0141 -0.1018***
(-0.48) (-0.15) (0.67) (0.10) (0.05) (-0.15) (-1.18) (-5.81)
DEBT 0.2831 -0.1013 -0.0723 0.2517 0.2088 0.2195 -0.0050 0.1216
(1.62) (-0.59) (-0.42) (1.56) (1.41) (1.62) (-0.06) (0.94)
LIQSALES -0.1437 -0.4586 -0.7312** 0.1693 0.3058 -0.0869 -0.2304 -0.2202
(-0.58) (-1.64) (-2.38) (0.77) (1.46) (-0.43) (-1.47) (-1.06)
PROFIT -0.4329 0.9460 0.9981 0.8244 0.0724 1.1037* -0.3863 -0.8347
(-0.57) (1.27) (1.29) (1.23) (0.12) (1.92) (-1.11) (-1.53)
AGE 0.0005 0.0017 -0.0406 0.0743 0.0014 0.0229 0.0377 0.0253
(0.01) (0.03) (-0.64) (1.22) (0.03) (0.47) (1.12) (0.54)
BANKRELATION -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0120 0.0189** 0.0248*** 0.0046 0.0188**
(-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.04) (1.15) (2.02) (3.19) (0.84) (2.14)
number of observations 353 343 343 351 345 354 350 323
pseudo R-squared  0.0650 0.0996 0.1361 0.1221 0.1374 0.1220 0.1323 0.2453 
 
 Appendix Table
 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks under Alternative Measure of Bank-firm Relationship: Panel C
   The Firm Group with Long Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Short Bank-firm Relationship with Second Bank 
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.1779** 0.1568** 0.1602** 0.1486*** 0.0094 -0.0162
(2.43) (2.06) (2.08) (4.33) (0.33) (-0.23)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.1918** 0.2545*** 0.0850 0.0211 -0.0280 -0.0151 0.0811
(2.37) (4.35) (1.03) (0.38) (-0.93) (-0.44) (1.20)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK 0.0580 0.1766*** 0.0565 0.1079* 0.0362 -0.0033 0.0306
(0.69) (2.93) (0.67) (1.79) (1.01) (-0.09) (0.45)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0285 0.1752* 0.0827 0.0010 0.0551 0.1235* 0.0604
(0.31) (1.93) (0.92) (0.02) (1.25) (1.85) (0.84)
SCNDBSHOCK 0.0515 -0.0255 0.0170 0.1044 0.0564 0.0015 0.1986**
(0.48) (-0.26) (0.17) (1.08) (1.33) (0.05) (2.04)
OTHRBSHOCK -0.0227 0.0902 0.1380 0.0412 0.0892 0.0641 -0.0599
(-0.21) (0.83) (1.32) (0.38) (1.20) (1.08) (-0.96)
ASSETS -0.0001 -0.0432* -0.0089 -0.0127 0.0072 -0.0117 -0.0275** -0.0589***
(-0.00) (-1.77) (-0.36) (-0.50) (0.42) (-1.22) (-2.39) (-2.81)
DEBT 0.0042 -0.1241 -0.0504 0.3672** 0.1108 -0.0076 0.0379 0.3128***
(0.03) (-0.89) (-0.36) (2.57) (1.11) (-0.15) (0.68) (2.83)
LIQSALES -0.1378 -0.0140 -0.1213 0.0398 0.0270 -0.0001 -0.1665 0.0226
(-0.62) (-0.07) (-0.57) (0.18) (0.18) (-0.00) (-1.59) (0.14)
PROFIT -0.4973 0.4315 0.7292 0.1873 -0.4004 -0.0137 -0.0759 -0.7560*
(-0.92) (0.80) (1.32) (0.34) (-1.10) (-0.07) (-0.37) (-1.91)
AGE -0.0252 -0.0375 -0.0207 0.0617 -0.0382 0.0233 0.0604** 0.0605
(-0.40) (-0.59) (-0.33) (0.96) (-0.89) (0.98) (2.17) (1.21)
BANKRELATION 0.0234 0.0036 -0.0060 0.0127 0.0171 0.0231*** 0.0138* 0.0251
(1.22) (0.19) (-0.30) (0.65) (1.32) (3.59) (1.82) (1.59)
number of observations 327 324 317 322 322 345 267 326
pseudo R-squared  0.0809 0.0951 0.0994 0.0912 0.1435 0.1954 0.2436 0.2049 
 Appendix Table
 Estimation Results of the Response Function to Shocks under Alternative Measure of Bank-firm Relationship: Panel D
The Firm Group with Short Bank-firm Relationship with Main Bank and Long Bank-firm Relationship with Second Bank 
explanatory equations 
variables  DMND SUPLYM SUPLYOTHR MAINB SCNDB OTHRB PUBFIN GUARNL
MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE MEASURE
DMNDSHOCK 0.2240*** 0.1887*** 0.1471*** 0.1359*** 0.1217*** 0.0837*** 0.0858***
(4.64) (4.14) (2.77) (2.81) (4.76) (4.72) (2.76)
SUPLYMSHOCK 0.2094*** 0.1914*** 0.0497 0.0127 0.0538 0.0410 0.0440
(3.06) (4.03) (0.74) (0.20) (1.09) (1.12) (0.87)
SUPLYOTHRSHOCK -0.0394 0.1059** -0.0381 0.0197 -0.0375 0.0032 -0.0387
(-0.60) (2.30) (-0.60) (0.33) (-0.91) (0.10) (-0.90)
MAINBSHOCK 0.0521 0.0070 0.0061 0.1184* 0.2006*** 0.0046 0.0536
(0.62) (0.09) (0.08) (1.71) (2.72) (0.13) (0.93)
SCNDBSHOCK -0.0197 0.0395 -0.0027 0.0560 -0.0443 -0.0084 -0.0437
(-0.23) (0.47) (-0.03) (0.76) (-1.08) (-0.24) (-0.96)
OTHRBSHOCK 0.0519 0.0262 0.0816 0.1353* 0.0164 0.0761 0.1241*
(0.64) (0.33) (1.04) (1.69) (0.25) (1.39) (1.73)
ASSETS 0.0241 -0.0133 0.0175 0.0274 0.0371** 0.0398*** -0.0396*** -0.0510***
(1.22) (-0.71) (0.98) (1.45) (2.08) (3.18) (-4.15) (-3.73)
DEBT 0.0787 0.1587 0.0388 0.4486*** 0.4107*** 0.0977 0.1587** 0.4732***
(0.59) (1.24) (0.32) (3.46) (3.35) (1.14) (2.36) (4.57)
LIQSALES -0.2188 -0.0526 0.0369 0.2219 0.1899 -0.0109 0.0738 0.2509
(-0.96) (-0.23) (0.18) (1.05) (0.93) (-0.08) (0.68) (1.59)
PROFIT 0.2610 0.2519 -0.1297 -0.3477 0.0387 -0.4431 -0.0930 -1.4964***
(0.43) (0.43) (-0.24) (-0.62) (0.07) (-1.09) (-0.32) (-2.92)
AGE -0.0224 -0.0262 -0.0694 -0.0478 -0.1183** -0.0817** 0.0798*** -0.0273
(-0.43) (-0.52) (-1.45) (-0.96) (-2.55) (-2.48) (2.78) (-0.80)
BANKRELATION 0.0064 0.0270** 0.0197* 0.0052 -0.0004 0.0212*** 0.0138** 0.0282***
(0.54) (2.39) (1.87) (0.46) (-0.04) (3.13) (2.30) (3.42)
number of observations 522 517 518 523 524 554 520 522
pseudo R-squared  0.0491 0.0661 0.0897 0.0718 0.0611 0.148 0.1707 0.2281
See the notes in Table 8. The variable DMNDSHOCK in Panel C predicts zero perfectly in PUBFINMEASURE equation
 so that we cannot obtain the coefficient estimate of DMNDSHOCK in this equation. 